The High Court granted an application to enforce an adjudicator’s decision in BMC Renovation Ltd (“contractor”) v Gael Property Investments Ltd (“employer”) [2026] IEHC 195. The judgment provides helpful clarification on issues relevant to the Construction Contracts Act 2013 (the “Act”) and the conduct of adjudications.

The background was that demolition and alteration works were carried out at a dwelling house owned by the employer, under a written agreement between the employer and contractor, both of whom were companies. A dispute arose and was referred for adjudication. In October 2025, the adjudicator awarded a sum to the contractor. When the contractor applied to Court to enforce the decision, the employer resisted on jurisdictional and fair procedures grounds.

Jurisdiction: was the agreement a “construction contract” under the Act?

The employer argued that the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction because the contract was not a “construction contract” under the Act.

Section 2(1)(b) of the Act provides that a contract is not a construction contract if it relates only to a dwelling, the dwelling has a floor area not greater than 200 square metres, and one of the parties is a person who occupies, or intends to occupy, the dwelling as his or her residence. The requirements of section 2(1)(b) are cumulative, and each must be satisfied before this exception can apply.

There was evidence that directors of the employer company planned to move into the property and use it as a family home. They indicated that the company would transfer ownership of the property to the directors.

The Court held that this “residential occupier exception” did not apply. The agreement was a construction contract for the purposes of the Act.  For the exception to apply, the Act requires that one of the parties to the contract is a person who occupies or intends to occupy the dwelling as their residence. In this case, however, both parties were companies.

The Court held that a company could never avail of the residential occupier exception as the statutory language (referring to “dwelling” and “his or her residence”) and legislative purpose clearly confined the exception to natural persons acting as consumers, not corporate entities. The intent of the residential occupier exception is that mandatory adjudication would only bite in the context of commercial transactions: it may be unrealistic to expect a residential occupier to comply with the tight timelines demanded by statutory adjudication.

The Court also noted that the respondent failed to raise this jurisdictional objection during the adjudication. Such failure would, generally, be fatal to any attempt to rely on the point to resist subsequent enforcement. While the Court noted that this general rule may have to be adjusted where the point goes to the very jurisdiction of the adjudicator to embark on the adjudication proceedings, the Court did not need to consider this point further, as the jurisdictional objection failed on its merits.

Fair Procedures: was the adjudication procedurally unfair?

The respondent argued that the adjudicator acted unfairly by seeking a 14‑day extension under section 6(7) of the Act with the consent of the contractor only, and by proceeding despite a director’s ill‑health.

The Court dismissed these arguments. There are two extension mechanisms in section 6 which are separate and distinct. The mechanism under section 6(6) is party‑driven, involving bilateral agreement. The mechanism under section 6(7) is adjudicator‑driven, enabling the adjudicator to extend the period in which he / she must reach a decision by up to 14 days, with the consent of the party who referred the dispute.

The Court confirmed that there is no obligation to consult the responding party before a section 6(7) extension is sought and obtained by the adjudicator. The fact that an adjudicator sought and obtained an extension under section 6(7) would not inhibit the operation of section 6(6): it was open to the parties to agree a further extension of time under section 6(6). These subsections are complementary, not mutually exclusive.

The Court found that the adjudicator had laid down a timetable which was fair and reasonable. Ill‑health of a director did not allow an adjudicator to extend time unilaterally. The issue of the director’s health was not raised until after the time for submissions had expired, during the period set aside for preparation of the written decision. An alleged breach of fair procedures would only ground the refusal of the enforcement application where a responding party can assert that the breach is material in the sense of having had a potentially significant effect on the overall outcome of the adjudication.

The judgment demonstrates that corporate employers cannot rely on the residential occupier exception, regardless of intended future occupation by directors. The Court has also restated the “pay now, argue later” principle, affirming that the grounds on which a Court will dismiss an enforcement application are strictly construed.